Accounting for Crises by Nagar, Venky & Yu, Gwen Gwen
Accounting for Crises
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Nagar, Venky, and Gwen Yu. "Accounting for Crises." American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 184–213.
Published Version https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.6.3.184
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16388193
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160416 
Accounting for Crises 
BY VENKY NAGAR

 AND GWEN YU 
We provide one of the first empirical evidence consistent with recent 
macro global-game crisis models, which show that the precision of 
public signals can coordinate crises (e.g., Morris and Shin 2002, 
2003; Angeletos and Werning 2006). In these models, self-fulfilling 
crises (independent of poor fundamentals) can occur only when 
publicly disclosed signals of fundamentals have high precision; 
poor fundamentals are the sole driver of crises only in low precision 
settings. We find evidence consistent with this proposition for 68 
currency and systemic banking crises in 17 countries from 1983-
2005. We exploit a key publicly-disclosed signal of fundamentals 
that drives financial markets, namely accounting data, and find that 
pre-crisis accounting signals of fundamentals are significantly 
lower only in low precision countries.  
Economy-wide crises are often triggered when agents in an economy 
withdraw demand from markets for most goods and collectively rush to money or 
other “safe” securities. An important goal of economic theory is to understand 
when this collective and coordinated action is driven by fundamentals, and when 
by agents’ self-fulfilling beliefs (e.g., Kindleberger 1978, Ch. 4). This goal is 
especially salient to current macroeconomic thought, which emphasizes the study 
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of agents’ behavior in financial markets (Bernanke 2010; Blanchard et al. 2010; 
Krugman 2010; Mankiw and Ball 2010, Section VI).
1
 This emphasis on the 
financial sector is of course by no means new. In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
model of the banking sector, self-fulfilling runs are always a possibility, while 
Gorton (1988), on the other hand, shows that fundamentals were the likely cause 
of panics during the U.S National Banking Era. More recent “global-games” 
models of coordinated action in financial markets allow for both fundamentals 
and self-fulfilling beliefs to cause crises (Atkeson 2000; Rey 2000; Morris and 
Shin 2002, 2003; Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2006; Angeletos and Werning 
2006; Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2007). These models suggest that self-
fulfilling crises are more likely to occur when public information that agents 
receive about asset fundamentals has high precision, and poor fundamentals are 
likely the sole determinant of crises when public signals about asset fundamentals 
have low precision. We find empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
Global-games models envision a situation in which an asset has an unknown 
fundamental strength and falls if enough investors attack it. To decide whether to 
attack, each investor needs both knowledge about the asset’s fundamental strength 
and a belief about what other investors are likely to do. We illustrate this 
mechanism by building a simple model extending Angeletos and Werning (2006, 
Section II). In our model, investors have initial heterogeneous private beliefs 
about an asset’s strength (which facilitates subsequent trade) and receive an 
exogenous public (e.g., accounting) signal about its strength. The investors then 
trade, and the trading price (noisily) aggregates their heterogeneous beliefs as well 
as the public signal. Armed with the trading price, public signal, and her private 
belief, each individual trader then decides whether or not to attack.   
 
1 For example, Mankiw and Ball (2010) Figure 19.2 shows how a drop in financial asset prices can be self-fulfilling by 
reducing consumers’ wealth and thus consumer spending and firm investment and, in turn, aggregate demand. In a similar 
refocus, Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) argue that the fundamental volatilities arising from firm and sectoral fluctuations are 
the primitives behind macroeconomic fluctuations in major world economies in the past half century. 
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As is standard in global games, our model’s solution indicates that there is a 
threshold beyond which the problem becomes non-convex and admits multiple 
solutions. This threshold is more likely to be reached as the exogenous public 
signal’s precision increases. The presence of such an exogenous signal is a new 
feature of our model compared to Angeletos and Werning (2006), where price is 
based just on the agents' private disagreement (and the supply shock). The 
introduction of an exogenous public signal alters several findings of Angeletos 
and Werning (2006). Specifically, the precision of the private disagreement no 
longer has a clear directional relation to the multiplicity threshold. This non-
directional relation extends to the price’s precision as well, because the price 
aggregates the private disagreement along with the exogenous public signal (and 
the supply shock). The clear directional movement towards the multiplicity 
threshold is thus special to the public signal’s precision. 
In an empirical setting, it is difficult to directly establish the presence or 
absence of multiplicity. However, one can exploit the economic intuition behind 
multiplicity, which is that precise public signals facilitate multiple self-fulfilling 
higher-order beliefs about other traders’ attack decisions. Thus, pre-crises signals 
of fundamentals in the high precision regime take a wider range (i.e., pre-crisis 
signals could be either high or low), whereas pre-crisis signals in the low 
precision regime are typically low. This premise on the differing properties of 
pre-crisis signals across the two regimes is consistent with our model, and could 
be tested if one could locate a public signal that is an important input into price. 
 Samuelson (1970, Ch. 5 Appendix), Rajan and Zingales (1998, p. 569), and 
Summers (2000, p.10) nominate the accounting system as the source of such a 
public signal. In particular, if one considers the fundamental strength of the firm 
as its economic profits (an interpretation that is consistent with the definition of 
asset strength in Angeletos and Werning 2006, Section II), the accounting 
estimate of true profits is an obvious and important public signal.  Note that 
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economic profits are not the same as cash flows: for example, certain sales may 
have been made not in cash but on good credit. These sales transactions affect 
current economic profits, but are not reflected in current cash revenues. The 
accounting system therefore provides estimates of these transactions in the form 
of accounting accruals (Sloan 1996; Fama and French 2006). The “marking to 
economic value” process of accruals brings accounting profits closer to true 
economic profits, as evidenced by accounting profits’ and accruals’ superiority 
over cash flows in explaining stock returns as well as future cash flows (Dechow 
1994; Barth, Cram, and Nelson. 2001). But the accrual estimation process 
naturally introduces measurement errors, driven both by uncertainty and 
managerial incentives. A deep body of accounting research has therefore 
developed empirical measures of the precision of the accrual estimation process. 
These precision measures can be usefully applied to test our model. 
We next locate a market to test our hypothesis. The global-games models 
assume a market that is too large for any individual speculator and prone to 
collective actions such as the coordinated withdrawal of capital. We argue that 
currency crises and their “twin” banking crises constitute a powerful setting that 
meets these criteria. In an influential paper, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find 
that the banking crises typically precede currency crises, and label them as “twin” 
crises. In line with our model, Kaminisky and Reinhart (1999, p. 473) note that 
either fundamentals or self-fulfilling expectations could be the cause for currency 
crises, which is the same argument made by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in the 
context of banking crises. We therefore combine the two types of crises, and 
examine 68 currency and systemic banking crises in 17 countries from 1983 to 
2005. We use the updated crises datasets of Kaminsky (2006) and the IMF 
(Laeven and Valencia 2008).  
Our goal is not to create a forecasting model of crisis that can be applied to 
any country to assess the probability of a crisis in any given year; instead we are 
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interested in assessing if crises that did occur were more likely preceded by poor 
signal realizations in the low precision regime than in the high precision regime. 
Towards this end, we follow the research design of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, 
Section III.A) and examine only countries with realized crises. Analogous to 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, Section III.A), it is the presence of both tranquil 
and crises periods in our panel dataset that generates the requisite within-country 
variation in the accounting signals of interest.
2
 
We construct a composite score of accounting precision for each country, 
based on the accounting data reported by its publicly-held firms. The accounting 
literature offers various empirical methods to estimate the precision of these 
accounting data, especially profits. We use six different precision measures from 
this literature, and construct a composite precision score for each country. We 
then use this composite score to split the countries into two groups of high and 
low precision. 
To construct the realized accounting signals, we aggregate all the firms in 
each country to yield two annual, country-based measures of performance: 
accounting profits and accounting accruals (i.e., the accounting adjustments to 
cash flows to yield accounting profits). We recognize the rich empirical “early 
warnings” literature on currency and banking crises. The existing macro leading 
indicators used in this literature and its empirical specifications form the obvious 
baseline for our empirical tests.   
We test the in-sample power of past accounting signals and other indicators to 
explain the occurrence of crises. Our unit of observation is the country-year for all 
variables. We represent the “twin crises” dynamics in a reduced form by 
constructing for each country year an indicator for recently suffered crises (within 
 
2 Our specification thus neither accounts for settings that were crisis-susceptible, but did not suffer one (due to luck or the 
central bank’s preferences and actions or other factors), nor does it fully account for the true heterogeneity of the crises that 
did happen. Our tests thus may overstate our model’s empirical validity. Kindleberger (1978, p.x) succinctly summarizes 
the perennial debate on the similarity and differences across crises by noting that some international economists are 
“clumpers” and others are “splitters”. 
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the last 3 years). We also include, among other controls, country fixed effects to 
control for unobserved factors at the country-level. 
We find that the pre-crisis accounting signals in low precision countries are 
significantly lower, as theoretically predicted. On the other hand, the pre-crises 
signals in the high precision countries are either insignificant or take higher 
values, an empirical finding consistent with the theoretical notion of multiplicity 
(which certainly allows for a pre-crisis boom). Figure 2 provides a comprehensive 
illustration of these results: both regimes show very similar behavior in tranquil 
years. But in the pre-crisis years, accruals and to a certain extent profits drop 
much more clearly in the low precision regime relative to the high precision 
regime. The drop in accruals indicates that the pre-crisis cash flows in low 
precision countries overstate economic profits. That is, the pre-crisis levels of 
cash flows may not be sustainable going forward, a sign of deteriorating asset 
fundamentals. This evidence is not only consistent with our model, but also 
demonstrates that the accounting system fulfills its stated purpose.  
Section I formulates our hypothesis analytically and locates it in prior 
research. Section II describes our data and our empirical constructs. Section III 
presents the main results. Section IV concludes. 
I. Model and Prior Research 
This section models a coordination game, closely following and building upon 
Angeletos and Werning (2006, Sections I and II). We use their model and its 
notation as much as possible, for ease of exposition. Briefly, their Section I 
models a coordination game with an exogenous signal, while their Section II 
removes this public signal and instead models a public asset price based on 
private disagreement and a supply shock. We extend the model by including both 
an exogenous public signal (e.g., an accounting report) and a price based on this 
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exogenous signal, disagreement, and a supply shock. This extension allows us to 
study the properties of the public signal in a financial market with a price.    
There is a status quo and a unit measure of agents, each of whom has to 
decide whether or not to attack the status quo. Not attacking pays 0, while 
attacking pays 1 , (0,1)c c   if the status quo is abandoned, and 0 – c if not. The 
status quo is abandoned if the measure of attackers is larger than the asset’s 
fundamental strength θ. The critical range of θ where the outcome depends on the 
size of the attack is therefore (0,1] . 
The initial belief on θ for all agents is an improper distribution. In the first 
step, each agent i forms her own private belief on θ. This belief could arise from 
any number of sources, and is represented by , ~ (0,1)i x i ix N     being 
independent error terms across the agents. The dispersion in private beliefs is 
necessary to get trading started. Then all the agents receive a common exogenous 
public accounting signal .    z zz  The error term  z  follows a normal 
distribution (0,1)N  and is independent of all other error terms. In the third step, 
the agents, who have a CARA utility function with risk parameter γ, trade in the 
style of Grossman (1976), i.e., agents are price-takers with rational conjectures 
about the information content of price, and prices are determined by a Walrasian 
auctioneer. In the fourth and final step, based both on her private signal and the 
public signals z and price, each agent decides whether to attack.   
  We first compute the third step. The Grossman (1976, Equation 11) demand 
for a trader who observes both z and p is (we drop the index i): 
 
[ | , , ]
( , , )
[ | , , ]
E x z p p
k x z p
Var x z p

 


.
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The aggregate demand over the unit continuum of traders matches the aggregate 
supply, which is the supply shock of , ~ (0,1)e e e N   and independent of all 
other error terms.
3
 The rational price function is conjectured as
p ep     .  
 
To solve the model, it helps to reframe the variances in terms of 
precisions
2 2 2 2, , ,x x z z p p e e       
       . Then we can write the 
conditional mean and variance as: 
[ | , , ]
1
[ | , , ]
  

  

  
 

 

 
x z p
x z p
x z p
x z p
E x z p
Var x z p
.
 
Equating aggregate demand and supply yields:
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( )( )x z
e e
p  
 

 
  
Solving for p yields e
e
x z
p

 
 
 

which in turn implies:  
2
,e x zp p e
x z
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
The price thus aggregates both the private disagreement and the public signal, 
as reflected in 
p .   
We next turn our attention to the final fourth step, namely solving for the 
attack threshold. Each agent attacks if her signal x is less than the threshold 
 
3 The supply shock is necessary, as the price is otherwise fully revealing (Grossman 1976, Equation 32). 
4 Aggregating the i.i.d signals
i
x over a unit continuum of agents requires integrating white noise, which is not Lebesgue-
integrable, but can be distributionally integrated to a Brownian motion. We follow the implicit assumption of Angeletos 
and Werning and assume that the integral is instead θ, the mean of 
i
x . One potential way to justify for this assumption is 
to compute the per capita demand and supply for a countably dense subset of agents over the unit continuum. The law of 
large numbers applies to 
i
x  in this case.  
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( , )x z p , and the status quo is abandoned if ( , )z p  , where  is the threshold 
level that is equal to the aggregate attack size Pr( | )x x  . But 
Pr( | ) ( ( ))xx x x     , where Φ is the standard normal CDF. We 
therefore get: 
11 ( )
x
x  

   . 
 
Next, the expected payoff to an agent from attacking is Pr( | , , )x z p c   ; 
therefore x must solve the indifference condition Pr( | , , ) 0x z p c    . Note 
that each agent views
1
~ ( , )
x z p
x z p x z p
x z p
N
  

     
 
   
. This indifference 
condition therefore becomes: 
 
[ ( )] .
px z
x z p
x z p x z p x z p
x z p c
 
   
        
      
     
 
 
Combining the two equations above and substituting x  leads to: 
 
1 1( ) 1 (1 )
z p z p z p
xx x
z p
c
     
 
 
 
  
      
. 
 
Note that both ,x  are functions of ,z p . We can reduce this dependence to 
one variable '
z p
z p
z p
z
 
 



. The mean of z’ is θ and the inverse of the variance 
'z z p    . The previous equation then becomes: 
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(1)  
1 1' ' ' '( ') ( ( ')) 1 (1 )z z z
xx x
z
z z c
  
 
 
         
 
At this juncture, we can recast Proposition 1 of Angeletos and Werning (2006) 
as: 
Proposition 1: Uniqueness is guaranteed if '
2
'
2xz
zx



  and multiplicity is 
possible only when '
2
'
2xz
zx



  .  
 
Proof: For every 'z , a candidate  always exists because the left hand side of (1) 
has a range of the entire real line. Differentiating the left hand side of (1) with 
respect to  yields
21( )
' 22z
x
e



  , which is always positive if 
' 2 0z
x



   . In that case, the left hand side of equation (1) intersects the 
right hand side at a unique  .5 See Figure 1 for an illustration.6  
 
5 In addition, note that a low of value of z’ leads to a high value of  , making it more likely that the status quo will be 
abandoned.  
6 Multiplicities of intersection points are an inherent property of smooth surfaces (see Guillemin and Pollack 1974, Ch. 2.4 
discussion of mod 2 intersection theory, for example).  One can obtain uniqueness of the fixed point by imposing 
geometric restrictions on the problem (which global games achieve by lowering the precision of the public signal), but 
once these restrictions are relaxed or perturbed (e.g., by homotopy), multiplicities are inevitable. This is the key 
mathematical reason why the multiplicity property in global games is so robust. Figure 1 shows that the number of 
equilibria is almost always 1 or 3, and 3 is 1 mod 2. (Mod 2 intersection theory is typically developed for compact 
manifolds, but we can envision compactifying the curves in Figure 1 into closed curves on a finite torus as follows: 
consider the vertical strip 0 1   and identify the line 0  with 1  , then monotonically retract the resulting open 
cylinder to finite length, then take its closure, and then identify the end points of all the vertical lines on it. The curves are 
then homotopic to the generators of the torus, and therefore transversally intersect an odd number of times.) Finally, note 
that the realizations of z' that yield other than 1 or 3 intersections have measure zero due to Sard's theorem. 
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We can write 
2
2
'
x z
z e
x
z x
 
 

 
  
  
  . We see that 
2
x z
z e
x
 
 


  
  
 
 is 
increasing in z and e , but the effect of x is ambiguous. If z x  , then it is 
increasing in x , but if z x  , then it is decreasing in x . This is in contrast to 
standard global games, where the multiplicity threshold is a function of 
2
x
z


 and 
thus has a monotonic association with the private signal precision (Angeletos and 
Werning 2006, Section I). More important, note that that the precision of price 
2
x z
e
 


  
 
 
 contains x , so we cannot make any claims on the impact of the 
precision of price on multiplicity without knowing the component that caused the 
precision of the price precision to change. This is in contrast to Angeletos and 
Werning’s (2006) Proposition 3, where all components of the precision of price 
affect the likelihood of multiplicity in the same direction.
7
 Taking all these results 
together, one unambiguous claim we can make is that multiplicity is more likely 
as the precision of the public signal z increases.
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A. Testing the Model in the Context of Prior Research 
We begin by cautioning the reader that the model’s highly stylized nature 
demands significant concessions from its empirical tests. We cannot directly test 
the key comparative static that multiplicity is more likely where the public signal 
has high precision because we have no way to directly establish the presence of 
 
7 If the precision of the exogenous public signal z is zero, we indeed obtain Proposition 3 of Angeletos and Werning 
(2006). We have checked that all aspects of our model match Angeletos and Werning (2006) when the precision of z is 
zero. 
8 Note that multiplicity is obtained for certain as the precision of z tends to infinity, but uniqueness is not guaranteed as the 
precision of z tends to zero 
12 3
(    ).2 2
could be ore x   
   
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multiplicity. However, the implication of multiplicity is that crises can occur in 
high precision settings for a wider range of the public signal realizations. To put it 
another way, crises in low precision countries are more likely to be preceded by 
low realizations of the public signal than crises in high precision countries. This is 
the proposition we test.  
If the only public signal in the model were price, its precision would depend 
on private disagreement and the supply shock. Comparative statics on the supply 
shock are uninteresting (the shock exists primarily to create an equilibrium 
(Grossman 1976, Equation 32)); therefore Angeletos and Werning (2006) focus 
on private disagreement. While theoretically interesting, private disagreement, by 
its very definition, is difficult to directly test empirically.   
 This scenario changes with the introduction of the public signal z. Our 
empirical proxy for z is the accounting signal of economic profits. This 
accounting signal and its precision, in contrast to private disagreement, are 
measurable, and therefore allow us to test our main prediction (we build on this 
point further at the end of this section where we discuss other models). 
We de-emphasize price as a signal because the precision of p does not have a 
clear empirical prediction. Furthermore, since our model is static, the price 
measures the same fundamental   as the signal z. In reality, however, the 
accounting signal z measures current period economic profits, whereas the stock 
price is a dynamic summary measure of current and all future period profits. We 
would have to make significant adjustments to the stock price to bring it in 
accordance with our static model in a Grossman (1976)-type trading setting. We 
therefore relegate the stock price to a control variable, and show that the results 
are robust to its inclusion (see Section III). 
The static nature of our model also implies that some adjustment for dynamics 
is necessary when testing the model using real-life data. Lacking theoretical 
guidance on dynamics, we employ a reduced form model by including a lagged 
12 
 
dependent variable as a regressor. We assume that our time-series is deep enough 
to render the Hurwicz bias insignificant. 
In a multiplicity setting, the number of intersection points is (almost always) 
an integer that jumps discretely when a critical geometric threshold is reached 
(e.g., Guillemin and Pollack 1974, Ch 2.4 and Figure 2). We therefore do not 
employ a continuous interaction term with the precision measure in our 
regressions, but instead nominate the cross-country sample median of the 
precision of z as a discrete multiplicity threshold that splits the sample into high 
and low precision countries.  
An important caveat is that the multiplicity threshold depends not only on z , 
the precision of the public signal, but also on , ,x e   , i.e., the precision of the 
private disagreement, the precision of the supply shock, and the risk aversion. We 
cannot estimate these latter three parameters. So we have to assume that they take 
values that do not overturn our partitioning scheme. We have been unable to 
conceive of any direct tests of this assumption.  The best we have been able to do 
is to use an alternative measure of accounting precision based on user perception 
(see Section III.D). 
Finally, the model shows that, irrespective of precision, uniqueness obtains if 
the signals realizations are extreme (Figure 1).
9
 We indirectly check this 
prediction in section III.D by examining the behavior of the signals prior to severe 
crises.  
Our tests also accommodate prior studies on crisis predictions. A brief 
description of this literature is as follows. The first-generation analytical and 
empirical crisis research focused on monetary and exchange rate policies as the 
determinants of crises (Krugman 1979; Blanco and Garber 1986). Subsequent 
 
9 At extreme realizations of z’, the left hand side of (1) is driven primarily by 1 , which is a monotonic function. The 
results are also unique if (0,1].   
13 
 
studies shifted to imperfections in financial intermediation as the cause.
10
 This so-
called 2
nd
 generation crisis channel promptly raised issues of coordination and 
multiple equilibria based on self-fulfilling beliefs. Whereas initial studies of 
multiplicities focused specifically on banks, it became evident that multiplicities 
could also occur as a result of coordination and increasing returns issues in 
production (Blanchard 2000, Section IV.3). Other studies — the so-called 3rd 
generation crisis models — implicated very specific financing channels, such as 
debt denominated in foreign currencies. More recent arguments have further 
broadened the scope of financial markets: Blanchard et al. (2010) note that “little 
attention was paid, however, to the rest of the financial system [apart from banks] 
from a macro standpoint,” and Krugman (2010) notes that crises need not 
necessarily arise from specific financial markets, such as the international 
exchange rate markets or corporate debt financed in foreign currency (i.e., the 
balance sheet effect); a collapse in the prices of any asset market that prevents 
firms from securing financing for ongoing operations is sufficient to trigger a 
crisis.     
Because the primary role of financial markets is to finance the production 
sector, an immediate consequence of broadening the financial markets in a crisis 
context is that the country’s production sector comes to the forefront. Modern 
models of crisis, in contrast to their first-generation counterparts, emphasize the 
production sector and the economy at large (Tornell and Westermann 2005; 
Martin and Rey 2006; Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann 2008), suggesting 
important roles for financial markets and sources of financial information on firm 
performance. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt in the early 
warnings literature to use accounting information to predict currency crises.
11
  
 
10 Early 20th century accounts of crises had implicated financial intermediation as a key cause of crises (Blanchard 2000, 
Section IV.2; Samuelson 2009), but the focus shifted away with the emergence of the IS-LM model and its descendants.   
11 Swanson, Rees, and Juarez -Valdes (2003) study the information content of accounting figures following the 1994 
Mexican currency devaluation. 
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Finally, on the subject of coordination issues, Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and 
Masson (2000) use non-linear empirical tests such as Markov switching to 
identify self-fulfilling beliefs in the devaluation of the French franc. Multiplicity 
in these models arises from factors such as central bank preferences that are not 
directly observable (see Jeanne (1997), Proposition 1). Consequently, these 
studies must infer the underlying parameters from data patterns, and then 
conclude based on the parameter estimates whether the crisis was self-fulfilling or 
not. While these unobservable factors could clearly be operational in our sample 
(and our model has several such parameters as well), our empirical prediction on 
where fundamentals work and where they do not is based not on unobservable 
parameters that must be inferred from the data, but on observable parameters such 
as the precision of the accounting signals. It is this observable feature of some of 
our underlying parameters that grants our empirical tests the power to reject the 
model.  
II. Data and Variable Definitions 
A. Currency Crises and Financial Data 
As mentioned earlier, our goal is not to create a forecasting model that 
predicts the probability of crisis in any country in any year; instead our goal is to 
examine the association between fundamentals and actual crises. We therefore 
follow the research design of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, Section III.A) and 
Gorton (1988) and others, who attempt to uncover the role of fundamentals in 
panics by analyzing the behavior of signals of fundamental during panic periods 
relative to some control tranquil periods. We likewise limit ourselves to countries 
that have experienced crises. Our sample choice ignores settings that did not 
experience crises, but would have been classified as crisis-susceptible by our 
model. This omission likely overstates the fit of our model.  
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To identify crises, we closely follow prior studies. Given the twin nature of 
banking and currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)), we use both types 
of crises. Kaminisky (2006) updates the data of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
and provides a detailed catalog of banking and currency crises. As explained in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of her study, Kaminsky (2006) uses 18 indicators to identify 
crises, and uses a regression tree methodology to classify the type of each crisis. 
Her online appendix provides the classifications and the dates of each crisis 
episode.
12
 In addition to Kaminsky (2006), the IMF has also produced its database 
of currency and systemic banking crises. This is publicly available as Laeven and 
Valencia (2008), which is an update of Caprio et al. (2005). We use both the 
Kaminsky and IMF data sets. Our Table 1 provides the details the country-years 
of our crisis sample.
13
 
In a few cases, the two datasets do not coincide, in which case we use 
Kaminsky (2006). Another interesting observation is that some ERM currency 
episodes such as the devaluation of the pound in 1992 do not make it into both 
datasets.
14
 We do not second-guess these choices. Also note that because our 
accounting data are annual, we only record the year of the crises. We next turn to 
accounting data. 
We collect firm-level accounting data from Thomson Datastream, which 
contains accounting information from the annual reports for each fiscal year of 
publicly traded companies around the world. To be included in our sample, a 
country must have more than five firm-year observations with non-missing values 
for a number of accounting variables, such as total assets, current assets, current 
 
12 http://home.gwu.edu/~graciela/HOME-PAGE/RESEARCH-WORK/MAIN-PAGE/working-papers.htm 
13 To justify their sample of crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, p. 474) quote Kindelberger (1978, p.14): “For historians 
each event is unique. Economics, however, maintains that forces in society and nature behave in repetitive ways. History is 
particular; economics is general.” Our sample selection choice therefore also faces the same critique. For an institutional 
analysis of crises, see Krugman et al. (1999). 
14 See Kaminsky (2006, footnote 29) for a discussion of her classification of the ERM crises. Her comments resonate with 
Krugman’s (1999, p. 438) observation that European countries that abandoned their principles seem to have gone 
completely unpunished.  Also see Buite, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998) for a theoretical and institutional discussion of the 
ERM crises.  
16 
 
liability, and net operating income. Datastream defines each firm observation by 
the unit of equity it issues. Thus, if a firm issues equities on two different 
exchanges, it will count as two firm observations. Because securities listed on a 
foreign exchange can also be subject to the accounting rules of the foreign 
country, we delete securities cross-listed on the U.S. stock exchanges. This 
deletion ensures that the accounting signals of each country are mostly an 
outcome of the local accounting standards. 
Our procedure yields 75,956 firm-year observations from 17 countries that 
experienced crises. The limited availability of firm-year observations in earlier 
years restricts our analysis to crisis episodes after 1983. This truncation removes 
some early reserves-based crises and makes the sample more relevant to our 
financial market based hypothesis. We then aggregate the firm-years into country-
years (we do not over-weigh country-years that have more firm-year 
observations). Our sample ends in 2005. These country-years include 68 crises.   
Table 1 shows our country sample, along with the classifications based on 
Kaminsky (2006, Table 4). Many of the crises events can be classified as either 
financial excess or sovereign debt. These types of crises typically arise from 
financial illiquidity problems following a period of high expansionary credit 
growth (Tornell and Westermann 2005). Financial markets thus appear to be 
important drivers of these crises, making them an appropriate setting for our 
study.   
We use the country-year panel dataset of 17 countries in the years 1983-2005 
for all our analyses. The presence of both tranquil and crises periods in our panel 
dataset generates the requisite (within-country) variation in the accounting signals 
of interest, analogous to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, Section III.A). Our 
decision to use all the above crises in the same panel dataset clearly obscures 
much heterogeneity, a crucial one being the cross-sectional and time-series 
differences in factors such as central banks’ willingness to defend the exchange 
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rate. The tranquil years in a country may also not be comparable because some 
years could contain failed attacks and other shocks.
15
 Finally, Buite, Corsetti, and 
Pesenti (1998) develop a multi-person game of crisis and argue that the 
appropriate unit of observation may not be a country, but a cluster of countries. 
We make no attempt to identify such country clusters. Our unit observation is an 
individual country-year.  
Table A1 (in the online Appendix) reports the crisis years as well as the 
number of public firms in our sample for each of the country-years. There is 
considerable variation in the number of firm-year observations across countries, 
reflecting differences in the level of industrialization, financial market 
development, and data availability. The shaded areas in Table A1 show 
considerable variation in the spread of crises across countries and time. Crises 
have some tendency to be clustered, reflecting the existence of the well-known 
“contagion effect” (Allen and Gale 2000; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh 2003; 
Yuan 2005). 
B. Precision of Accounting Signals 
We now describe our composite measure of accounting precision for each 
country. The accounting literature — see summaries in Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) — has extensively researched the precision 
or ability of accounting measures to capture true economic profits. The source of 
accounting (im)precision arises from the following problem: period t cash flows 
are not period t economic earnings. For example, some sales could have been in 
the form of credit or accounts receivables, and thus do not appear in cash 
revenues. Alternatively, some assets may have to be written off, leading to an 
economic loss, but there may be no immediate cash flow impact. Accounting 
 
15 However, Figure 2 shows that, at least for the accounting signals, the tranquil periods appear tranquil; see Section III for 
details. 
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therefore adjusts cash flows to construct a measure of earnings or profits. This 
adjustment, called accruals, brings the accounting earnings figure closer to 
economic profit (Dechow 1994; Barth, Cram, and Nelson. 2001). 
To users of financial statements, these accrual adjustments are relevant, but 
their reliability can be imperfect. Specifically, the reliability, or precision, can be 
impaired because management can misuse its discretion over accruals to conceal 
economic reality, or it can make estimation errors. The noise in these adjustments 
is our proxy for the precision of the public signal. Note again that we are not 
measuring the variance of the overall performance signal; we are measuring the 
noise in the accounting adjustments. This is precisely the measure that the crisis 
models require.   
But what factors contribute to the quality of the accounting estimates?  In 
addition to proximate factors such as audit quality and capital market discipline, 
recent accounting research points to deeper institutional factors such as 
accounting rules, legal enforcement, and the legal regime (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin 2000). These factors vary across countries, yielding the institutionally-
driven cross-country variation in our sample’s accounting precision (we discuss 
this point more at the end of this subsection). 
While recognizing accounting precision’s conceptual and institutional 
importance, the accounting literature has not converged on a universally accepted 
measure of accounting precision. Different accounting studies pick different 
properties of accruals to measure the precision of accounting profits. We employ 
six commonly used measures that capture various dimensions along which 
accounting information reliably reflects the relevant firm fundamentals. Table 2 
defines these six measures in detail, as well as their sources in the literature. We 
aggregate each measure to the country level by using the median of the firm-year 
observations. We sign the measures so that lower values reflect higher precision. 
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 Our first measure of accounting precision, accruals quality (=AQ
1
), captures 
the estimation errors in the accounting process by measuring how well accrual 
estimates map into cash flow realizations. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
we operationalize this measure as the standard deviation of the residual from a 
country-level regression of current accruals on multi-period operating cash flow. 
A lower standard deviation implies higher accounting precision.  
Our second measure, AQ
2
, proxies for the level of management discretion, 
often known as “smoothing” behavior (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; Trueman and 
Titman 1988).  Smoothing refers to managers misusing their reporting discretion 
to conceal economic shocks by over-reporting poor performance and under-
reporting strong performance. The accounting literature has traditionally used a 
strong negative correlation between changes in accruals and operating cash flows 
to proxy for management intervention over and above the natural level of accruals 
accounting (e.g., Francis et al. 2005). The negative of this correlation is then our 
AQ
2 
measure.   
The remaining four measures of accounting precision (=AQ
3
, AQ
4
, AQ
5
, and 
AQ
6
) are various measures of the magnitude of accruals. Sloan (1996) suggests 
that large accruals involve a higher degree of subjectivity that can often result in 
both intentional and unintentional reporting errors. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 
(2003), on the other hand, argue that the larger the absolute magnitude of 
accruals, the more room the manager has to exercise discretion in reporting 
earnings. We measure these two concepts both with current accruals (=AQ
3
, AQ
,4
) 
that arise from operating activities, and total accruals (=AQ
5
, AQ
6
) that include 
accruals from both operating and financing activities. We scale the accruals as per 
the original papers.   
Then, as defined in Table 2, we construct a composite measure of accounting 
precision from the six AQ measures to eliminate potential measurement error. We 
rank each measure across all countries and take the mean of the six ranks as a 
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composite country index of accounting precision. This is our country-based 
measure of the precision of the public signal. 
Table 3 sorts the countries in ascending order based on the composite index, 
with lower scores reflecting higher accounting precision. All six individual 
measures exhibit large variation across countries, but similar rankings in terms of 
relative magnitudes. The magnitudes of the measures conform to prior literature 
(Bhattacharya, Daouk, and, Welker 2003, Table I and III; Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki 2003, Table II), with some differences due to different sample periods. 
Finally, we dichotomize the sample at the median into countries with high and 
low accounting information precision. Table 3 provides the results.  
With some exceptions, emerging markets are likely to be low precision 
countries, and mature markets the high precision countries. Our precision 
classification is also in line with prior studies that suggest that institutional 
characteristics (La Porta et al. 1997) and the enforcement of contracts (Ball, 
Kothari, and, Robin 2000) are related to the accounting information environment. 
For example, Table 3 shows high ranks for European countries, such as Denmark, 
Finland, Spain, and Sweden, whereas developing countries like Argentina and 
Brazil rank among the countries with low accounting precision. We examine the 
enforcement issue systematically using the rule of law index from the 
International Country Risk Guide, which ranks countries on a rule of law index 
(0-10), 10 being the highest. The average score for our high precision countries is 
8.29, which is significantly higher (p = 0.012) than the average score of 5.65 for 
the low precision countries. Our accounting precision dichotomy thus appears to 
have some degree of institutional validation. 
21 
 
C. Realized Accounting Signals 
Having described the precision of the public accounting signal (signal z), we 
now turn to the measurement of the signal itself. Table 4 provides the definitions 
for the two accounting signals we use to operationalize the realization of the 
signal z. The two measures are a) accruals and b) accounting earnings (or profits). 
These measures are particularly well suited to global games’ notion of 
fundamental strength (or θ) because highly profitable entities likely have lower 
demand for interim external financing (Kaplan and Zingales 1997). Note that our 
measures pertain to actual firm operations because our primary object of interest 
is operating asset strength, not investors’ propensity to continue financing.16 We 
obtain the median of each measure separately for each country-year and nominate 
it as the countrywide measure for that year.   
Realized Accounting Signal: Operating Profitability.— The first accounting 
signal that we employ, operating profitability, requires little motivation. Dechow 
(1994) shows that investors perceive operating earnings to be a more important 
performance measure than operating cash flows. We define operating profitability 
as the country median of firm-level net operating income scaled by beginning 
total assets. Table 4, Panel B indicates that operating profits average a reasonable 
8.5 percent of assets. 
Realized Accounting Signal: Operating Accruals.— The second accounting signal 
we employ, Accrualsc,t, represents the adjustment to cash flows to yield 
accounting earnings, all based on operating activities, to more accurately reflect 
the economic strength  .  
 
16 The terminal asset value in global-games models depends both on the current operating fundamentals and the likelihood 
that investors will provide the requisite refinancing. For a study that empirically distinguishes the first factor from the 
second in a manner similar to ours, see Andrade and Kaplan (1998).   
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Our focus on operating accruals has substantive precedence in the valuation 
literature (e.g., Jones 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; Sloan 1996; 
Fama and French 2006). In addition to changes in current operating assets and 
liabilities, our definition of operating accruals includes the reversal of certain non-
current operating asset accruals by subtracting depreciation and amortization. We 
compute accruals from the balance sheet and income statement information. We 
do not use the cash flow statement to compute accruals because of the limited 
availability of cash flow information across countries and time. 
Note that accrual quality forms the basis of our measure of the precision of 
accounting information. However, the aggregation process we use to arrive at the 
precision measure is very different from the realized accrual signal itself. The 
cross-country variation in the levels, magnitudes, and other higher moments of 
accruals serves as a proxy for accounting precision, while the within-country 
variation serves as a signal of fundamentals.
17
  Table 4, Panel C shows that the 
two accounting signals, profits and accruals, are correlated at 0.63 in our sample. 
D. Macroeconomic Leading Indicators in Prior Literature 
The general conclusion of the crisis prediction literature is that an effective 
warning system should consider a large variety of indicators (Edison 2003; 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998). We adopt the leading indicators 
proposed in Appendix A of Edison (2003), who constructs this list by building 
upon Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998). Following Edison (2003), Table 
1), we group our list of 18 indicators into five major categories: current account 
indicators, capital account indicators, real sector indicators, domestic financial 
indicators, and global indicators. 
 
17 This is akin to the standard statistical estimation of mean and standard deviation, where the same underlying data are 
aggregated differently. 
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Table A2, Panel A provides definitions for all 18 leading indicators, their data 
sources (primarily the International Financial Statistics), and the predicted 
direction of changes prior to a currency crisis. All indicators are defined as a 
percentage change from the previous year, except for the indicators that already 
measure deviation from a trend.
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III. Results 
This section proceeds in four stages: we first show the univariate results 
graphically. We then show the results in a multivariate setting. We then analyze 
the multivariate results by providing detailed economic explanations for the 
coefficients of the accounting signals. Finally, we conduct robustness tests to 
examine the sensitivity of our results. 
A. The Story in Pictures 
Figure 2 reports the movement in the accounting signals three years before 
and after the crises. Accounting signals show clear movement around the crises, 
with pre-crisis accruals dropping more clearly for low precision countries, 
indicating, in a sign of deterioration of fundamentals, that the pre-crisis levels 
cash flows may not be sustainable going forward. This result for low precision 
countries is consistent with our prediction.   The trends are more similar in profits. 
By contrast, in the tranquil years the data are indeed tranquil across both sets of 
countries (and similar in magnitude). This feature gives us confidence in the 
validity of both our crises and tranquil periods, and in our decision to use these 
periods to generate within-country variation in our accounting signals.  
 
18 Those two indicators are the excess real exchange rate and excess real M1 balances. Also, if a macroeconomic series is 
missing entirely for a given country, we assume that that series is zero in order to retain that country in our regression 
analysis. The presence of country fixed effects in all our regressions should mitigate the impact of this data choice on the 
other countries in the sample. Section III.D provides robustness tests related to the indicators. 
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The reader may wonder about the negative accruals in the tranquil periods. 
Table 4, Panel B indicates that the mean of accruals is -0.006. For comparison, 
Sloan (1996, Table I) reports accruals of -0.03 for US firms. More interestingly, 
recent studies such as Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2009) find that, at the 
aggregate level, accruals are positively associated with growth and future 
performance. The downward trend in accruals before a crisis in low precision 
countries is therefore not unexpected. Section III.C provides more insight into the 
specific nature of the movements we see in Figure 2. 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
We next conduct an in-sample analysis with our country-year panel data set 
using multivariate regressions. We specify the following probit model, which we 
run separately for high- and low-precision subsets of countries (i.e., ,X H L  
below). This specification allows for the coefficients for all regressors to vary 
across the two subsets: 
(2) 
2 18
i i k k
c,t X X c,t n X X c,t n c,t
i 1 k 1
D_ crisis Acc.Sig. LDV Lead.Indic. 
 
             
 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that turns on when country c 
has a crisis in year t. LDV is the lagged dependent indicator variable that takes a 
value 1 if there was a crisis in the same country in the last three years. Our 
specification is thus a reduced-form dynamic model.  
The coefficients iH  (
i
L ) measure the associations between the crisis year t 
and years , ( 0,1,2)t n n   accounting signals for subsets of countries with high 
(low) accounting precision (all accounting signals in the two pre-sample years 
1981 and 1982 are coded as missing). In addition to the accounting signals, we 
also use the 18 leading indicators described in Section II.D. Our choice of 
25 
 
windows of up to two years prior is based on Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, 
Section III.A), who argue that early warning signals occur in a 24-month prior 
period for currency crises and a 12-month prior period for banking crises.   
The majority of the early warnings literature takes the signals approach 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Section III.A), where the indicators issue a signal 
whenever they move beyond a certain threshold (this threshold is calculated from 
the data itself). However, our ability to estimate the optimal threshold is impaired 
by the limited frequency of annual accounting data. Our use of multivariate probit 
models thus mirrors Frankel and Rose (1996), who use similar predictive and 
contemporary regression specifications in their Table 1.
19
   
We also include country fixed effects to control for any unknown country-
level factors that are constant over time but that vary by countries (the intercept in 
equation (2) must therefore be viewed as a short-hand for the fixed effects). The 
fixed effects thus shift the baseline probability of a crisis but do not absorb the 
effect of time-varying crisis predictors on crises (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan 2004, equation 1). We also allow for a time trend and within-year 
cross-sectional correlations in the error terms (to account for contagion-type 
effects). 
Before we discuss the results, we wish to emphasize that the word “predict” in 
the ensuing discussions should be construed as a shorter way of writing 
“explanatory power” of prior-year accounting signals. We do not mean for 
“predict” to have a forecasting connotation, because our sample only contains 
countries that had crises, not the world at large.
20
  
We first present the results without the precision dichotomy. Recall we have 
no conjectures for the accounting signals over the entire sample. The results, in 
 
19 Berg and Pattillo (1999) assess the pros and cons of the two approaches, and conclude in their Section 3.2 that probits 
slightly outperform the signal threshold approach.  
20 Gorton (1988), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Berg and Pattillo (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and 
Edison (2003), among others, conduct similar in-sample exercises.  
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Table 5, show that accounting signals overall have no predictive power. Some of 
the significant one-year ahead early warning indicators are: real exchange rates, 
industry production, excess real M1 balances, domestic credit, commercial bank 
deposits, and oil prices, all with the predicted signs. There is certainly much 
variation in prior studies’ findings on the early warning indicators, but we believe 
that our findings square well with the last but one column of Edison (2003, Table 
5), which shows that these signals have some of the highest probability of 
predicting a crises when they are emitted. Likewise, Frankel and Rose (1996, 
p.351) also show that a drop in industry production and a high growth in domestic 
credit, among other factors, are significant predictors in crashes. These results 
give us some comfort on the empirical validity of our setting.
21
 Finally, the lagged 
dependent variable is not significant in the one-year ahead predictive model, but 
is in the two-year ahead predictive model. Thus, although crises are not highly 
autocorrelated events, it is important to control for their dynamics. 
C. Main Results 
We now compare the predictive power of the accounting signals across the 
two groups of accounting precision. Table 6 presents the results. Recall that 
accruals are adjustments made to the cash flows to compute economic or 
accounting profits. Holding accounting profits constant, a decrease in accruals 
implies that a smaller portion of the current economic profit will be realized as 
future cash flows. In other words, future cash flows are likely to be lower than 
suggested by current cash flows. A classic example of a negative accrual is a 
write off. Write-offs immediately recognize the loss of future benefits of some 
asset. However, this information cannot be gleaned from this period’s cash flows. 
Another negative accrual is an increase in account payables (e.g., delaying 
 
21 Please see Table A3, Panel A for the average marginal effects of the probit coefficients.  
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payments to employees and vendors). This accrual recognizes an increase in 
future cash obligations, an event that has no immediate impact on current cash 
flows. Thus, decreases in accruals reflect the manager’s recognition of increases 
in future obligations (or decreases in future benefits) that are yet to happen, and 
therefore not evident in current cash flows. A similar argument in the opposite 
direction can be made for positive accruals (such as an increase in current 
receivables that will turn into cash later).
22
  
The economic time-series interpretation of accruals above is consistent with 
the statistical within-firm variation interpretation of the coefficients in the panel 
regressions in Table 6 with fixed effects. Table 6, Panel A shows that two years 
prior to the crisis in high precision countries, the accrual coefficient of 20.245 is 
positive and statistically significant: managers are actually expecting a higher 
portion of the current economic profits to be realized in the future (i.e., future 
cash flows are likely to higher than suggested by just the current cash flows). This 
is consistent with our model which, because of multiplicity considerations, makes 
no directional predictions on the link between fundamentals and crises for high 
precision countries: in these countries, the model indicates that self-fulfilling 
beliefs are more active and crises can hit for a wider range of fundamentals.
23
    
In the year prior to the crisis, accounting signals in high precision countries 
show no impact, a finding also consistent with the presence of multiplicity in this 
region. But in the low precision countries, accruals decline significantly at the 5 
percent level. This is what our model predicts when it states that low signal 
realizations are the unique cause of crises in low precision settings. 
The coefficients of the probit regression cannot be interpreted directly. In 
Table A3, Panel B, we compute the marginal effect averaged over all the 
 
22 It is for these reasons that Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001) find accounting earnings and accruals to be superior 
predictors of future cash flows than current cash flows themselves. 
23 These results are also consistent with Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Rancier, Tornell, 
and Westermann (2008) who document a domestic boom prior to crises. 
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observations. In the pre-crisis year for the low precision countries, the coefficient 
on accruals is -0.346, suggesting that for a .01 decrease in accruals, the 
probability of a crisis in these countries in the subsequent year increases by 0.346 
percent. This is about the same magnitude that Frankel and Rose (1996, p. 362) 
report for their FDI inflows regressor. A 0.01 decrease in accruals is quite feasible 
is our sample; Table 4, Panel B indicates that the standard deviation of accruals is 
0.268. These magnitudes provide economic plausibility to the important result 
that pre-crisis accruals are significantly lower only in the low precision 
countries.
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The results on accruals thus far obtain after controlling for profitability. As an 
additional check, Table 6, Panel B shows that the same results on pre-crisis 
accruals obtain even after dropping the profitability regressor (the average 
marginal effects in Table A3, Panel C are also similar). The robustness of the 
accruals result is particularly valuable because it shows that accounting practices 
matter: it is the application of accounting rules to the measurement of firm 
operations that generates critical asset-pricing information. Accounting 
adjustments thus play the role they are supposed to play (Summers 2000, p.10).
25
  
To investigate our pre-crisis accruals results further, we test if any systematic 
component of accruals is causing the results. We decompose accruals into 
 
24 Table A3 also reports the standard error of the marginal effects, which are computed using the delta method that 
linearizes the average marginal effect using the first order Taylor expansion. The significance of other coefficients in Table 
A3, Panel B largely line up with Table 6, Panel A. One difference is that the profits in low precision countries in the pre-
crisis year are positively significant. Holding accruals constant, an increase in profits suggests an increase in cash flows. 
One explanation for the positive coefficient on the pre-crisis profits and negative coefficient on the pre-crisis accruals in 
the low precision countries is that the pre-crisis cash flows are booming, but managers are indicating via accruals that these 
cash flows are not going to persist in the future.  
25 Although the accounting data are impacted by a country’s institutions, the accounting signals could gain power in low 
precision countries because of more severe institutional measurement weaknesses in other early warning signals. Likewise, 
accounting signals could lose significance in high precision countries because of the institutional measurement superiority 
of other early warning signals. The predictive significance of the accounting signals in both high and low precision 
countries (albeit at different times) should partly alleviate this concern. Table 6 also indicates that the explanatory power of 
the other leading indicators (excluding the accounting signals) in the pre-crisis years are not that different across the two 
sets of countries (the year -1 yields an explanatory power of 0.348 for low precision counties and 0.376 for high precision 
countries). One explicit way to check for the unreliability of macroeconomic series is suggested by Michalski and Stoltz 
(2013), who use deviations from Benford’s laws to infer strategic misreporting of macroeconomic data. However, those 
authors note on p.598 that their statistical approach is better suited for quarterly data, and not for annual data (that we use). 
We therefore acknowledge the possibility of systematic quality problems in our macroeconomic series, but make no 
corrections to them.  
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changes in current operating asset (ΔCA), changes in current operating liability 
(ΔCL), and depreciation. At this detailed level of granularity, different firms 
could be adjusting different factors of account; so one may not expect any one 
component of accruals to be the systematic predictor of crises, even when total 
accruals are. And in fact, we are unable to see any meaningful systematic 
variation in any particular subset of accruals.
26
  
The crisis year is equally interesting. First, all McFadden R
2
 are much higher, 
suggesting that all measures are better at reflecting the occurrence of a crisis than 
predicting it. The high precision countries consistently show a significant decline 
in profits and accruals at the end of the crisis year, suggesting that although the 
causes of the crises were not associated with low signal realizations, the 
occurrence of crisis is followed by low signal realizations. This aftermath is 
consistent with the message of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). However, the same 
cannot be said of the low precision countries. Although the signals were low in 
these countries pre-crisis, they show no significant deterioration in the aftermath. 
The profit effect is neutral and accruals actually pick up significantly after the 
crisis, suggesting more confidence in the future.  
One potential explanation for the above result comes from the cross-sectional 
variation in the aftermath of crises, as shown in Figures 1-4 of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009). Those figures indicate that many of our low-precision countries 
show a shorter duration of the aftermath than many of the high-precision 
countries.
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 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p.469) themselves make the observation 
that emerging markets do better than advanced countries in employment recovery, 
speculating as causes structural macroeconomic factors such as a greater 
downward flexibility in wages in emerging countries. Such positive economic 
 
26 A similar point is made in a different context by Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), who argue that because 
activities such as expropriation can take many forms, their systematic evidence should be present in overall measures of 
firm performance measures rather than their specific components. 
27 For example, in their Figure 3, the duration of unemployment was about 3 years for the 1997 Malaysian crisis, and about 
7 years for the 1987 Norwegian crisis. 
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factors could, in the aftermath, increase the coefficient on accruals in the low 
precision countries. Additionally, the same structural macroeconomic flexibility 
could have also enabled the companies to cut costs fast enough to the keep the 
profit effect neutral in the crisis aftermath. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
study to fully explore the variations in the aftermath (which depend on factors 
ranging from the impact on imports and exports and the level of foreign currency-
denominated debt to post-crisis fiscal and trilemma-related policies), such 
connections with prior studies, while undoubtedly speculative, serve to further 
support our model and empirical findings.   
Finally, to complete our model, we include equity prices as an additional 
regressor. We define stock price movements as the percentage change in the 
country’s equity index over the year. Table 7 presents the results. The negative 
predictive significance of the accounting accruals in the year prior to the crisis in 
low precision countries is robust to the inclusion of the stock price. The stock 
prices are not a predictor of crises.
28
  But they fall significantly in the aftermath in 
both high and low precision countries, suggesting that the low precision countries 
do suffer a loss of investors, even though their immediate post-crisis profits 
themselves do not show any significant movement (after controlling for accruals). 
Our speculative conjecture is that investors appear to be unconvinced about these 
markets’ future prospects, despite their firms’ efforts to contain the losses.  
D. Robustness Tests 
We next conduct the following additional robustness tests: 
(i) Our data do not account for crises that were deterred or did not happen 
even though they were theoretically likely. To partially account for this 
omission, we nominate the less severe crises as those falling into these 
 
28 Our estimation technique does not construct the composite signal z’, but instead includes z and p separately. Table 7 
indicates that z appears to be a stronger predictive signal than p. 
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categories. We repeat our analysis by redefining the crisis year indictor as 
1 only if the year after the crisis saw an output loss for that country that 
was greater than the concurrent sample median (all the other crises thus 
become non-crises). We obtain similar results in Table A4. Accounting 
accruals in year -1 are significant negative predictors only in low precision 
countries. The aftermath results are similar to Table 6, Panel A. 
(ii) The descriptive statistics for all the leading indicators are reported in 
Table A3, Panel B. Some leading indicators have extreme values. The 
extreme values for the currency overvaluation variable are from Indonesia 
and Mexico during periods of high inflation. The extreme values for the 
excess real M1 balances are due to the EU countries that experienced a 
discontinuity in the M2 measures in 1999. Our main results hold if we 
winsorize these indicators (Table A5). 
(iii) We use an alternative measure of accounting precision based on a user 
perception of accounting information, as opposed to the properties of 
reported earnings. We construct an accounting precision measure based on 
the forecast frequency of financial analysts, who are key users of 
accounting information. Financial analysts collect, process, and most 
importantly, disseminate information about a firm to the public. As a 
result, prior literature argues that the number of analysts following a firm 
is indicative of the quality of the public information available about the 
firm (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996; Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000). We 
divide the sample into high and low precision countries using analyst 
following as the measure, and examine the predictive power of the 
realized accounting signals.   
Table A6 lists the countries’ new partition, which shows a 
considerable overlap with our existing partition. This congruence is 
additional validation for our partition approach. Table A6 also shows that 
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the realized accounting accruals in the year prior to the crisis are a 
significantly lower only in countries with low analyst following (though 
the statistical significance is at the 10 percent level). Accruals in year -1 
are insignificant in countries with high analyst following. The aftermath 
looks similar to Table 6, Panel A, though the joint and individual 
significances are somewhat different. This result suggests that our main 
findings mostly hold with user perception measures of accounting 
precision. In addition, this analysis also demonstrates both the importance 
and the empirical difficulties of identifying the multiplicity threshold 
correctly.  
(iv) Finally, Table A7 shows that our main results are robust to switching from 
a probit to a logit regression model. Accounting accruals in the year prior 
to the crisis are significant negative predictors only in the low precision 
countries. The aftermath is similar to Table 6, Panel A as well. Thus, our 
results are not driven by the functional form of the binary choice model. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Disagreements about basic macroeconomics paradigms (e.g., Solow 2010) 
suggest that macroeconomics is unlikely to converge on a unified theory of crisis: 
the underlying phenomena are too complex to be definitively abstracted. Our 
more modest goal is therefore to empirically show that the global-game 
coordination models are a viable abstraction of the true complex processes that 
precipitate crises, after controlling for previously posited determinants.   
We build and test a global-game model in the context of accounting data and 
the “twin” currency and systematic banking crises, choices that we have justified 
at length in our paper. Our evidence that the pre-crisis accounting signals of 
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fundamentals are significantly lower only in low precision countries is consistent 
with our model. 
Our findings have two implications. First, as suggested by Summers (2000, 
p.10) and Rajan and Zingales (1998, p. 569), the application of accounting rules 
and principles to measure firm operations indeed appears to generate asset-pricing 
information relevant to macroeconomic phenomena (in our case crises). Second, 
as financial markets continue to gain prominence in macroeconomic research, 
global games offer an important insight: improvements in the public signals in 
such markets do not necessarily offer a monotone improvement in these markets’ 
ability to allocate resources; investors can also get more unnecessarily “spooked.” 
However, such non-convexities do not easily lend themselves to straightforward 
empirical analyses. It is our position that, in this "age of accounts" (to use 
Samuelson's (1970, Ch.5) felicitous phrase), innovative use of institutional data 
such as accounting has the power to overcome these empirical barriers. 
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FIGURE 2  REALIZED ACCOUNTING SIGNALS BEFORE AND AFTER 68 CRISIS EPISODES 
[C=COUNTRY, 17 COUNTRIES; T=YEAR, YEARS = 1983 – 2005] 
Panel A: Accrualsc,t 
Crisis years:         Crisis years:     Tranquil Years:   Tranquil Years: 
High Precision Nations  Low Precision Nations    High Precision Nations  Low Precision Nations  
 
  
Panel B: Profitc,t 
 
Notes: See Table 1 for crisis years and Table 4 for definitions of each accounting signal.  Low and high accounting information quality countries are defined in Table 3.  “Tranquil” years are all 
years that are not within 24 months before and after the start of a currency crisis.  The horizontal axis represents the number of years before and after a crisis (or tranquil) year.  The vertical axis 
represents the level of realized accounting signals.  The solid line represents the country median of realized accounting signals before and after crisis (or tranquil) years.  The bands represent the 
upper and lower quartiles of the realized accounting signal. 
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TABLE 1  CRISIS YEARS 
Country Type of crisis  
  Currency crises Systemic Banking crises 
 Financial Excess Sovereign debt Others (Fiscal deficit, Current 
account, Sudden stops) 
 
Argentina  1987 
1989 
1990 
 
 
 
 
2002 
  1985a 
1989 
1994 
2001 
Brazil  
 
 
 
1999 
1983 
1987 
1989 
1990 
1991 
  
  1985a 
  1990b 
1994 
Denmark   1993   1987a 
Finland  1991 
1992 
 1991 
India      1993b 
Indonesia 1983 
 
1986 
1997 
1998 
   1992a 
1997 
Italy 1990    
Japan      1997b 
Malaysia  
1997 
1998 
   1985a 
1997 
Mexico 1994     1992a  
  1994b 
Norway  1998 
1999 
2000 
1986 
1992 
 
  1988a 
  1991b 
Philippines 1983 
1984 
 
1986 
1997 
   1983b 
  1997a 
South Korea      1997b 
Spain 1992 
1993 
   
Sweden  1992  1991 
Thailand 1984 
 
1997 
1998 
1999 
 
2000 
1983 
1996 
Turkey    1994 
2001 
  1991a 
  1994a 
 2000 
Total # of crisis 
years 
11 22 
 
7 
 
28 
Notes: Crisis episodes are taken directly from the Excel supplement of Kaminsky (2006) available on-line (http://home.gwu.edu/~graciela/HOME-
PAGE/RESEARCH-WORK/MAIN-PAGE/working-papers.htm), and from the systemic banking crises dataset of Laeven and Valencia (2008, Table 
1). We include all crises from 1983, the beginning of our sample period. Crisis starting years are taken directly from the Excel supplement of 
Kaminsky (2006), column B and E. For the systemic banking crises episodes of Laeven and Valencia (2008), we use the starting dates provided in 
Table, column 2 of Laeven and Valencia (2008). There are two banking crises with discrepancies in dates across the two databases: Argentina in 1994 
(1995 in Laeven and Valencia) and Thailand in 1996 (1997 in Laeven and Valencia). For the starting dates of these three crises, we follow the years 
from Kaminsky (2006). 
a Systemic banking crisis years that appears only in Kaminsky (2006). 
b Systemic banking crisis years that appears only in Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
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TABLE 2  INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES’ MEASURES OF ACCOUNTING SIGNAL PRECISION 
(C=COUNTRY, F=FIRM, T=YEAR) 
 Description  Measure  
AQ1c,t 
Accruals quality 
Measures how well accruals flow into past, current, and 
future cash flow realizations 
(Source: Dechow and Dichev 2002) 
1
, ,( )c t f c tAQ    
0 1 2
c,f ,t c,t c,t c,f ,t 1 c,t c,f ,t c,t c,f ,t 1 c,f ,t
ˆ ˆ ˆˆAccruals CFO CFO CFO    
 
       
 
AQ2c,t 
Smoothing 
Measures the extent to which accounting accruals offset 
cash flow shocks 
(Source: Francis et al. 2005) 
, , , ,2
,
, , 1 , , 1
,
c f t c f t
c t
c f t c f t
Accruals CFO
AQ Corr
TotalAsset TotalAsset
 
     
          
     
 
AQ3c,t  
Accruals 
Level of accruals 
(Source: Sloan 1996) 
, ,3
,
, , 1
c f t
c t f
c f t
Accruals
AQ Median
TotalAsset

 
   
 
 
AQ4c,t  
Absolute 
accruals 
Magnitude of accruals 
(Source: Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003) , ,4
,
, ,
c f t
c t f
c f t
Accruals
AQ Median
CFO
 
 
 
 
 
AQ5c,t  
Total accruals 
Level of total accruals 
(Source: Richardson  et al. 2005) 
 
, ,5
,
, , 1
c f t
c t f
c f t
TotalAccruals
AQ Median
TotalAsset

 
   
 
 
AQ6c,t  
Absolute total accruals 
Magnitude of total accruals 
(Source: Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003) 
 
, ,6
,
, ,
| |
c f t
c t f
c f t
TotalAccurals
AQ Median
CFO
 
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 
 
 
AQic,t,P i= 1..6 Time averaged measure over a P-year rolling window 
, , , 1
1
1
( ),
P
i i
c t P c t p
p
AQ AQ i
P
 

   
AQic  i= 1..6 Per-country mean of each measure  ,
i i
c t c t
AQ Mean AQ  
Notes: Each measure is defined such that a lower value represents higher accounting precision. 
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 
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TABLE 3  COUNTRIES’ AVERAGE MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING PRECISION 
(C=COUNTRY, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 TO 2005) 
Panel A: Countries with high accounting precision 
Country 
# of 
years 
# of firm- 
years 
Level of accounting precision averaged over the sample period Composite country index 
{ ( )}i
i c c
Mean Rank AQ  where i = 1...6 1
c
AQ  2
c
AQ  3
c
AQ  4
c
AQ  5
c
AQ  6
c
AQ  
Denmark 21 2,426 0.0512 0.8917 -0.0485 0.5567 0.0391 0.6339 5.2 
Spain 21 1,804 0.0499 0.9340 -0.0369 0.4484 0.0588 0.6596 5.5 
Norway 22 2,145 0.0621 0.6576 -0.0505 0.5585 0.0496 2.3362 6.5 
Sweden 23 3,748 0.0519 0.8204 -0.0334 0.4701 0.0662 0.8025 6.5 
Finland 21 1,948 0.0149 0.8963 -0.0567 0.6056 0.0594 0.6825 7.3 
Mexico 21 2,112 0.0491 0.8299 -0.0138 0.4706 0.2293 1.5416 7.3 
India 16 4,244 0.0519 0.7606 -0.0186 0.4488 0.0899 0.8172 7.5 
Japan 21 23,738 0.0683 0.9854 -0.0276 0.5307 0.0264 0.7133 8.2 
          
 
Panel B: Countries with low accounting precision 
Country 
# of 
years 
# of firm- 
years 
Level of accounting precision averaged over the sample period Composite country index 
{ ( )}i
i c c
Mean Rank AQ where i = 1...6 1
c
AQ  2
c
AQ  3
c
AQ  4
c
AQ  5
c
AQ  6
c
AQ  
Philippines 17 1,524 0.0474 0.8479 -0.0288 0.5072 0.0739 0.9692 8.3 
Thailand 18 5,822 0.0581 0.9186 -0.0303 0.5720 0.0697 0.8302 8.3 
Italy 23 4,162 0.0558 0.9073 -0.0492 0.6570 0.0621 0.9541 8.7 
Indonesia 16 2,618 0.3759 0.9777 -0.0332 0.6353 0.0072 1.0548 10.7 
Malaysia 23 5,786 0.0826 0.9230 -0.0130 0.5578 0.0527 1.0483 11.0 
South Korea 20 6,567 0.0958 0.9494 -0.0262 0.6229 0.0557 0.9771 11.7 
Argentina 19 662 0.0674 0.5242 0.3258 0.9821 2.4680 6.2378 13.2 
Turkey 18 1,344 0.1818 0.7641 0.0643 0.6701 0.4428 2.0100 13.2 
Brazil 18 5,393 0.3056 0.8400 -0.0206 0.6597 3.5114 4.4988 14.0 
          
Notes: The variable definitions of accounting signal precision are in Table 2.  
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TABLE 4  DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ACCOUNTING SIGNALS 
(C=COUNTRY, F=FIRM, T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
 
Panel A: Definitions of accounting signals 
Notes: 
     , , , , , , , ,
                                      =(  ) (  , , , , , ,
Operating Accruals Current operating asset Current operating liability Depreciationc f t c f t c f t c f t
Current Asset Cash Current Liabilityc f t c f t c f
   
    ), ,, , , , ,STDebt TaxPayable Depreciationt c f t c f t c f t  
 
 tfcNI ,, = Net operating income.  
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of accounting signals 
 Variables  N Mean Std dev. 1 percentile 25 percentile 50 percentile 75 percentile 99 percentile 
 
Accrualsc,t 
311 (0.006) 0.268 (0.116) (0.049) (0.033) (0.014) 0.201 
 
Profitabilityc,t 321 0.087 0.131 (0.004) 0.043 0.062 0.089 0.513 
 
Panel C: Correlation of accounting signals and leading indicators  
   D_crisisc,t Accrualsc,t Profitabilityc,t 
D_crisisc,t 1.00   
Accrualsc,t 0.19 1.00  
Profitabilityc,t 0.17 0.63 1.00 
 
Notes: Panel C displays all the pairwise correlation coefficients between accounting signals and leading indicators. Refer to Table A2 and Panel A for the definitions of the leading indicator 
variables and accounting signals.
Accounting Signal Description Measure  
Accrualsc,t 
Country median of firm level accruals scaled by 
lagged total assets 
 , ,
,
, , 1
Operating Accrualsc f t
accruals Medianc t f
TotalAssetsc f t
 
 
  
 
Profitabilityc,t 
Country median of firm level net operating income 
scaled by lagged total assets 
, ,
,
, , 1
NIc f t
profitability Medianc t f
TotalAssetsc f t
 
 
  
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TABLE 5 COMBINED SAMPLE ANALYSIS OF CRISES USING REALIZED ACCOUNTING SIGNALS 
(C=COUNTRY; T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
Model: 
 
  
Prior period  [-n =-2] Prior period [-n =-1] Concurrent [-n =0] 
  
 coefficient (se) coefficient (se) coefficient (se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals (= i )   
Accrualsc,t 
 
-0.602 (0.52) -2.268 (1.39) 1.507* (0.90) 
Profitabilityc,t 
 
0.428 (1.24) 0.925 (1.75) -5.215* (3.05) 
F- test [P-value]:  χ2 (2) =1.36 [0.505] χ2 (2) =2.66 [0.264] χ2(2)=3.58 [0.167] 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) - 0.281* (0.15) -0.103 (0.13) -0.188 (0.18) 
Table A2’s Prior literature’s leading indicators and time trend (= k ) 
Over-valuationc,t 
- 
-0.004** 0.00 -0.001*** 0.00 -0.000*** 0.00 
Importsc,t 
+ 
0.003 (1.09) 0.621 (0.55) -2.022* (1.18) 
Exportsc,t 
- 
-0.842 (1.06) -0.460 (1.10) 1.184 (1.09) 
Foreign exchange reservec,t 
- 
0.513** (0.23) 0.224 (0.25) -1.210*** (0.43) 
M2/foreign exchangec,t reservec,t 
+ 
-0.115*** (0.04) 0.173* (0.09) 0.276*** (0.06) 
Real interest rate differentialc,t 
+ 
1.021 (2.27) -1.908 (1.86) -4.997*** (1.77) 
Short term debt/reservesc,t 
+ 
-0.011 (0.12) 0.137 (0.17) 0.244* (0.13) 
Industry productionc,t 
- 
-0.347 (2.50) -9.486*** (2.54) -16.594*** (3.59) 
Stock pricesc,t 
- 
-0.721* (0.39) -0.161 (0.56) -1.019** (0.49) 
M2 multiplierc,t 
+ 
-0.248 (0.48) -0.326 (0.48) -0.721* (0.38) 
Domestic credit/GDPc,t 
+ 
2.120*** (0.74) 1.554** (0.78) -3.558** (1.44) 
Domestic real interest ratec,t 
+ 
1.052 (2.27) -1.893 (1.85) -4.953*** (1.76) 
Commercial bank depositsc,t 
- 
0.680 (1.09) -2.271** (0.97) 1.619 (2.18) 
Lending/deposit interest ratec,t 
+ 
-0.211 (0.15) -0.015 (0.02) -0.004 (0.02) 
Excess real M1 balancesc,t 
+ 
0.000 0.00 0.002*** 0.00 0.002*** 0.00 
G7 outputt 
- 
-0.590 (0.61) -0.873 (0.69) 1.002* (0.54) 
US interest ratet 
+ 
37.902*** (12.26) 4.721 (17.08) -1.670 (15.18) 
Oil pricest 
+ 
0.901* (0.53) 1.545** (0.70) 0.157 (0.57) 
Year trendt 
 
-0.057** (0.02) -0.091*** (0.03) -0.127*** (0.03) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error clustering on year Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 277 294 311 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.278 0.304 0.443 
Mc Fadden’s R2 (excluding accounting 
signals) 
0.275 
 
0.288 
 
0.422 
 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year.  See Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table A2 and Table 4 for 
definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one if there was a crisis that occurred within the last three calendar years, and zero otherwise.   ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
 
          
2 18
i i k
c,t c,t n c,t c,t n c,t
i 1 k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator LeadingIndicators        
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TABLE 6 ANALYSIS OF CRISES USING PRIOR OR CONCURRENT ACCOUNTING SIGNALS: BY LEVEL OF ACCOUNTING PRECISION 
 (C=COUNTRY, T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
Panel A: Using Accruals and Profitability  
Model:  
 
          
2 18
i i k
c,t c,t n c,t c,t n c,t
i 1 k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator LeadingIndicators        
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
  Prior period 
[-n =-2] 
Prior period 
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent 
[-n =0] 
 
 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals (= i ) 
Accrualsc,t               1      20.245*** -4.290 -0.449 -2.833** -35.060*** 4.232*** 
  
(7.42) (5.09) (6.72) (1.26) (13.46) (1.19) 
Profitabilityc,t 2    -6.313 4.065 -16.924 2.340 -179.467*** 1.765 
  (13.65) (2.72) (13.08) (1.51) (39.69) (4.48) 
        
F- test: β1 ,  β2=0 
[P-value]: 
χ2 (2) = 8.98 
[0.001] 
χ2 (2) = 2.63 
[0.269] 
χ2 (2) = 1.90 
[0.387] 
χ2 (2) = 6.30 
[0.043] 
χ2 (2) = 22.51 
[<0.001] 
χ2 (2) = 12.73    
[0.002] 
Leading indicators from Table A2 and 
time trend Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 135 142 143 151 151 160 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.424 0.463 0.389 0.388 0.789 0.636 
Mc Fadden’s R2 (excluding 
accounting signals) 
0.386 0.438 0.376 0.353 0.642 0.579 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis  is an indicator variable indicating  a crisis year.  See Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table 3 for definitions of the country samples with high and low accounting precision, and to 
Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Standard errors clustered by year are in parentheses.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
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TABLE 6 ANALYSIS OF CRISES USING PRIOR OR CONCURRENT ACCOUNTING SIGNALS: BY LEVEL OF ACCOUNTING PRECISION (CONTINUED) 
 (C=COUNTRY, T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
Panel B: Using Accruals only 
Model:  

        
18
i i k
c,t c,t n c,t c,t n c,t
k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator LeadingIndicators        
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
  Prior period 
[-n =-2] 
Prior period 
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent 
[-n =0] 
 
 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals (= i ) 
Accrualsc,t               1      19.208** -0.937 0.294 -2.475* -13.208 4.365*** 
  
(7.93) (1.05) (6.21) (1.32) (8.37) (1.28) 
        
        
Leading indicators from Table A2 and 
time trend Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 135 142 143 151 151 160 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.423 0.442 0.376 0.378 0.649 0.635 
Mc Fadden’s R2 (excluding 
accounting signals) 0.386 0.438 0.376 0.353 0.642 0.579 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis  is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year.  See Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table 3 for definitions of the country samples with high and low accounting precision, and to 
Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Standard errors clustered by year are in parentheses.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
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TABLE 7: ANALYSIS OF CRISES USING ACCOUNTING SIGNALS AND EQUITY PRICE 
(C=COUNTRY; T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
Model: 
  
 
            
2 18
1 i i i k
c,t c,t n c,t n c,t c,t n c,t
i 1 k 1
D_Crisis Stockprice AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator LeadingIndicators         
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Prior period                                                  [-n =-
1] 
Concurrent                                                [-n 
=0] 
 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Stock pricec,t β
1 0.204 -1.275 -6.797*** -4.021** 
  (0.69) (1.00) (2.58) (1.97) 
Accrualsc,t β
2 -0.449 -2.833** -35.060*** 4.232*** 
  (6.72) (1.26) (13.46) (1.19) 
Profitabilityc,t β
3 -16.924 2.340 -179.467*** 1.765 
  (13.08) (1.51) (39.69) (4.48) 
      
F- test:  β1 ,  β2 = 0 
[P-value]: 
χ2 (3) = 2.26    [0.520] χ2 (3) = 6.68   [0.083] 
χ2 (3) = 23.14    
[<0.001] 
χ2 (3) = 27.37    
[<0.001] 
Leading indicators from Table A2 
and time trend Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 143 131 151 139 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.389 0.370 0.769 0.683 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year. See Table 1 for crisis years. Stock price change is the percent change in 
equity index (IFS.62.ZF). Refer to Table 3 for a definition of the country sample with high and low accounting precision, and to Table A2 
and Table 4 for definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Standard errors clustered by year are in parentheses.  
***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
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TABLE A1: CRISIS STARTING YEARS AND NUMBER OF PUBLIC FIRMS 
 Currency crises 
   Systemic banking crises 
   Currency & systemic banking crises 
Number of public firm-year observations 
Year Argentina Brazil Denmark Finland India Indonesia Italy Japan Malaysia Mexico Norway Philippines 
South 
Korea Spain Sweden Thailand Turkey 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 
1985 0 0 4 7 0 0 8 2 5 7 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 
1986 0 0 4 10 0 0 15 11 7 7 12 0 1 3 8 0 0 
1987 2 0 5 13 0 0 39 18 10 12 16 0 1 8 12 0 0 
1988 6 15 36 38 0 0 186 37 35 38 66 0 13 54 85 4 2 
1989 7 99 96 76 0 0 200 142 43 47 82 5 73 71 113 8 10 
1990 7 113 125 90 6 2 207 614 50 48 97 5 106 76 145 21 18 
1991 7 111 127 90 6 10 208 933 55 47 97 10 99 86 149 42 21 
1992 16 148 134 90 32 86 208 1057 106 77 96 36 100 89 154 141 24 
1993 21 151 137 89 137 94 200 1085 135 90 90 46 111 92 160 231 28 
1994 26 162 143 92 156 101 191 1127 138 105 101 52 165 92 171 301 40 
1995 30 197 143 93 175 106 200 1182 156 114 97 57 194 93 184 318 38 
1996 28 253 141 93 256 147 195 1219 234 112 97 82 218 97 184 346 41 
1997 37 256 171 116 281 155 210 1255 267 120 165 87 259 119 236 372 53 
1998 39 278 175 131 298 161 231 1288 304 125 172 88 299 116 270 385 73 
1999 49 319 167 130 305 163 247 1789 309 164 156 103 383 117 265 375 89 
2000 60 571 154 126 309 193 262 1791 342 170 128 113 649 116 270 375 111 
2001 66 561 145 134 350 262 268 1863 548 172 129 152 667 119 263 517 131 
2002 68 541 140 132 412 282 262 2019 671 173 124 165 731 114 253 532 140 
2003 68 529 137 128 437 286 268 2035 710 167 129 175 814 113 261 585 169 
2004 64 541 124 132 510 284 276 2109 794 162 141 172 837 117 279 631 179 
2005 61 548 118 132 574 286 273 2162 863 155 142 176 847 110 277 638 177 
Total # of 
firm-years 662 5393 2426 1948 4244 2618 4162 23738 5786 2112 2145 1524 6567 1804 3748 5822 1344 
# of crisis 
years (sum 
of shaded 
cells) 
7 8 2 2 1 5 1 1 3 2 7 4 1 2 2 7 4 
Notes: Figures in the table represent the number of public firm observations in each country-year with financial data (total asset, net income from operations, current assets and current liabilities) available in 
Thomson Datastream.  Shaded cells represent the year of the beginning of a crisis as described in Table 1.
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TABLE A2: DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PRIOR LITERATURE’S LEADING INDICATORS 
(C=COUNTRY, T=YEAR) 
Panel A: Definition of leading indicators 
Category Indicator (Variable name) Definition Measure & data source Predicted association with crisis  
Current 
account   
Deviation from the expected real 
exchange rate (XS_realEXc,t) 
Deviation of real 
exchange rate from 
time (year) trend 
regression 
- residual value from time trend 
equation estimated by each country 
- real exchange rate= nominal bilateral 
exchange rate
*
 (IFS.00ae) (US 
CPI/domestic CPI) (IFS.64.ZF) 
Over-valuation of local currency is 
linked to currency crisis  
(-) 
Imports (ΔImportsc,t) Percent change in 
imports 
- imports (IFS.70.ZF) Weak external sector  (+) 
Exports (ΔExportsc,t) Percent change in 
exports  
- exports (IFS.71.ZF) Weak external sector (-) 
Capital 
account 
Foreign exchange reserve 
(ΔFXreservec,t) 
Percent change in 
foreign exchange 
reserve 
- foreign exchange reserve = Total 
reserve minus gold (IFS.1L.ZF) 
Loss of foreign reserve is a 
characteristic of currency crisis; 
Krugman (1979) 
(-) 
M2/foreign exchange reserve 
(ΔM2_FXreservec,t) 
Percent change in 
M2/foreign exchange 
reserve 
- M2= Quasi money (IFS.35.ZF) 
- foreign exchange reserve (IFS.1L.ZF) 
Expansionary monetary policy 
and/or sharp decline in reserve is 
associated with a currency crisis 
(+) 
Real interest rate differential 
(interest_diff c,t) 
Level of foreign and 
domestic interest rate 
differential  
- foreign real interest rate = US lending 
interest rate – US inflation rate 
calculated from US CPI 
- domestic real interest rate = lending 
interest (IFS.60P.ZF) – domestic 
inflation rate  
High world interest rate can lead to 
reversal of capital flow 
(+) 
Short term debt/reserves 
(ΔST_debt c,t) 
Percent increase in ST 
debt 
- ST debt = debt with maturity less than 
1 year (from BIS database)  
- foreign exchange reserve = Foreign 
exchange (IFS.1L.D.ZF) 
Increase in ST debt is associated 
with currency crisis 
(+) 
Real 
sector    
Industry production (ΔOutputc,t) Percent change in 
output 
- industry production (IFS.66A.ZF) Recessions often precede crises (-) 
Stock price 
(ΔEquity c,t) 
Percent change in 
equity index 
- equity indices  
(IFS.62.ZF) 
Burst of asset bubble often precedes 
currency crisis 
(-) 
* The nominal exchange rate between the currencies of domestic countries and the U.S., expressed as the number of US currency units per domestic currency unit. 
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 TABLE A2: DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PRIOR LITERATURE’S LEADING INDICATORS (CONTINUED) 
Domestic 
financial 
M2 multiplier, 
(ΔM2_multiplierc,t) 
Percent change in M2 
multiplier 
- M2 multiplier = M2 / Base money 
- M2= Money ( IFS.34.ZF) + Quasi 
money (IFS.35.ZF) 
- base money (IFS.14.ZF) 
Rapid growth of credit (+) 
Domestic credit/GDP, 
(ΔDomes_creditc,t) 
Percent change in 
domestic credit 
- domestic credit (IFS.32.ZF) 
- GDP (IFS.99B.ZF) 
Credit expands prior to crisis (+) 
Domestic real interest rate 
(Dom_real_interestc,t) 
Domestic real interest 
rate 
- real exchange rate = deposit interest 
rate (IFS.60L.ZF) – inflation 
 - inflationc,t=(CPIc,t-(CPIc,t-1))/(CPIc,t-1) 
(IFS.64.ZF) 
Higher real interest rate can signal 
liquidity crunch or may have been 
increased to defend against 
speculative attacks 
(+) 
Commercial bank deposits 
(Δcomm_depositc,t) 
 
Percent change in 
commercial bank 
deposits deflated by 
CPI 
- commercial bank deposits = demand 
deposits (IFS.24.ZF) + other deposits 
(IFS.25.ZF) 
- CPI (IFS.64.ZF) 
Loss of deposits occurs as crisis 
unfolds 
(-) 
Lending/deposit interest rate 
(ΔLD_ratio c,t) 
Level of lending to 
deposit ratio 
- lending interest (IFS.60P.ZF) 
- deposit interest (IFS.60L.ZF) 
Lending rates tend to rise prior to a 
crisis due to a decline in loan quality 
(+) 
Excess real M1 balances 
(XS_real_MIc,t) 
Ml deflated by 
consumer prices less 
estimated demand for 
money 
- each country’s money demand 
equation is estimated as a function of 
real GDP, domestic CPI, and time 
(=year)  
- M1 = Money (IFS.35.ZF) 
- CPI (IFS.64.ZF)  
- real GDP= GDP (IFS.99B.P) 
Loose monetary policy can lead to a 
currency crisis 
(+) 
Global G7 output 
(G7_GDP_growtht) 
Percent change in 
Changes in G7’s 
average real GDP 
growth 
- weighted average of G7 real GDP 
growth  
- real GDP= GDP (IFS.99B.ZF) / CPI 
(IFS.64.ZF) 
Foreign recessions often precede 
crises 
(-) 
U.S. interest rate 
(US_real_interestt) 
Changes in level of US 
real interest rate 
- real interest rate = nominal interest 
(IFS.60L.ZF) – inflation rate 
- inflation=(CPI-lag(CPI))/(lagCPI) 
(IFS.64.ZF) 
Increase in foreign interest 
associated with capital outflows 
(+) 
Oil prices 
(Oil_pricet) 
Percent change in oil 
price 
- oil price (IFS.0017.AAZ) High oil prices are associated with 
recessions 
(+) 
Notes: All leading indicator variables are taken directly from the Edison (2003) Appendix A. All leading indicators are measured as annual percentage changes, except (a) interest rate measured as 
changes over the previous twelve months, (b) real exchange rate as a deviation from time trend, and (c) excess M1 as residuals from the money demand equation.  Source: International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and other sources as noted. 
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TABLE A2: DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PRIOR LITERATURE’S LEADING INDICATORS (CONTINUED) 
(C=COUNTRY, T=YEAR) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of leading indicators 
Variables   N Mean Stn dev. 1 percent 20 percent Median 75 percent 20 percent 
Current Account Over-valuationc,t 339 (32.0) 673.7  (3626) (1.46) (0.26) 1.11  2,417
†  
Importsc,t 339 0.10  0.16  (0.31) 0.00  0.10  0.18  0.54  
Exportsc,t 339 0.10  0.11  (0.13) 0.02  0.09  0.17  0.38  
Capital Account 
Foreign exchange reservec,t 339 0.19  0.44  (0.58) (0.02) 0.14  0.30  1.97  
M2/foreign exchangec,t  339 0.67  5.90  (0.64) (0.12) 0.00  0.18  18.21  
Real interest rate differentialc,t 339 (0.90) 8.96  (30.95) (0.04) (0.01) 0.01  0.41  
Short term debt/reservesc,t 339 0.10  0.56  (0.67) 0.00  0.00  0.00  2.72  
Real Sector Industry productionc,t 339 0.04  0.06  (0.09) 0.00  0.03  0.07  0.21  
Stock pricesc,t 339 0.14  0.44  (0.37) (0.02) 0.00  0.25  1.11  
Domestic Financial M2 multiplierc,t 339 (0.01) 0.25  (0.91) (0.06) 0.00  0.05  0.78  
Domestic credit/GDPc,t 339 0.00  0.16  (0.54) (0.03) 0.01  0.05  0.41  
Domestic real interest ratec,t 339 0.90  8.96  (0.37) 0.00  0.02  0.05  30.99  
Commercial bank depositsc,t 339 0.07  0.33  (0.50) 0.00  0.04  0.11  0.69  
Lending/deposit interest ratec,t 339 2.28  4.60  0.00  1.22  1.53  2.14  29.36  
Excess real M1 balancesc,t 339 (7.37) 229  (884.5) (6.20) (0.01) 0.34  1,185
††   
External G7 outputt 339 (0.01) 0.25  (0.41) (0.19) (0.03) 0.09  0.56  
US interest ratet 339 (0.00) 0.01  (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 0.01  0.01  
Oil pricest 339 0.07  0.25  (0.48) (0.12) 0.03  0.28  0.57  
† Extreme values consist of observations from Indonesia and Mexico during periods of high inflation. 
†† Extreme values are driven by EU countries that have discontinuity in M2 measures post year 1999.  
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TABLE A3: MARGINAL EFFECTS AVERAGED OVER THE SAMPLE 
(C=COUNTRY; T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Crises Using Accounting Signals in Table 5 
 
   Prior period  [-n =-2] Prior period [-n =-1] Concurrent [-n =0] 
  
 
dF
dX
 ∆ method 
se 
dF
dX
 ∆ method 
se 
dF
dX
 ∆ method 
se 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals    
Accrualsc,t  -0.092 (0.07) -0.348* (0.19) 0.188* (0.11) 
Profitabilityc,t  0.065 (0.15) 0.142 (0.23) -0.652* (0.36) 
        
F- test [P-value]:  χ2 (2) =1.94 [0.379] χ2 (2) =3.43 [0.180] χ2(2)=3.97** [0.138] 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) - 0.044* (0.02) -0.016 (0.02) -0.023 (0.02) 
Table A2’s Prior literature’s leading indicators and time trend  
Over-valuationc,t - -0.001*** (0.00)  -0.0001** (0.00) -0.00004** (0.00) 
Importsc,t + 0.001 (0.14) 0.095 (0.07) -0.253* (0.13) 
Exportsc,t - -0.128 (0.13) -0.071 (0.15) 0.148 (0.13) 
Foreign exchange reservec,t - 0.078** (0.03) 0.034 (0.03) -0.151*** (0.05) 
M2/foreign exchangec,t reservec,t + -0.018*** 0.00  0.027** (0.01) 0.035*** (0.01) 
Real interest rate differentialc,t + 0.156 (0.28) -0.293 (0.26) -0.624*** (0.21) 
Short term debt/reservesc,t + -0.002 (0.01) 0.021 (0.02) 0.030** (0.02) 
Industry productionc,t - -0.053 (0.31) -1.457*** (0.37) -2.073*** (0.38) 
Stock pricesc,t - -0.110** (0.05) -0.025 (0.07) -0.127** (0.06) 
M2 multiplierc,t + -0.038 (0.06) -0.050 (0.06) -0.090** (0.05) 
Domestic credit/GDPc,t + 0.323*** (0.09) 0.239** (0.11) -0.444*** (0.16) 
Domestic real interest ratec,t + 0.160 (0.28) -0.291 (0.26) -0.619*** (0.21) 
Commercial bank depositsc,t - 0.104 (0.14) -0.349** (0.14) 0.202 (0.25) 
Lending/deposit interest ratec,t + -0.032* (0.02) -0.002 0.00  -0.001 0.00  
Excess real M1 balancesc,t + 0.000 0.00  0.0004*** (0.00) 0.00017*** (0.00) 
G7 outputt - -0.090 (0.08) -0.134 (0.09) 0.125** (0.06) 
US interest ratet + 5.779*** (1.41) 0.725 (2.27) -0.209 (1.74) 
Oil pricest + 0.137** (0.07) 0.237*** (0.09) 0.020 (0.07) 
Year trendt  -0.009*** (0.00) -0.134 (0.09) -0.016*** (0.00) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 # country-years 277 294 311 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.278 0.304 0.443 
       Mc Fadden’s R2 (excluding 
accounting signals) 
0.275 
 
0.288 
 
0.422 
 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year.  See Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table A2 and Table 4 for 
definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if there was a crisis that occurred within the last three calendar years, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients represent the 
marginal effect averaged over all observations. Standard errors in parentheses are obtained using the delta method. ***, **,* denote significance 
at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE A3: MARGINAL EFFECTS AVERAGED OVER THE SAMPLE (CONTINUED) 
 (C=COUNTRY, T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Crises Using Accounting Signals in Table 6 Panel A 
Model:  
 
          
2 18
i i k
c,t c,t n c,t c,t n c,t
i 1 k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator LeadingIndicators        
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
  Prior period 
[-n =-2] 
Prior period 
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent 
[-n =0] 
 
 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
 
 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals  
Accrualsc,t                  1.593*** -0.419 -0.066 -0.346** -0.878** 0.332*** 
  (0.45) (0.41) (0.84) (0.15) (0.34) (0.08) 
Profitabilityc,t    -0.497 0.397* -2.502 0.286** -4.492*** 0.138 
  (0.88) (0.22) (2.86) (0.14) (0.98) (0.32) 
        
 
  
  
  
Leading indicators from Table A2 
and time trend Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 # country-years 135 142 143 151 151 160 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.424 0.463 0.389 0.388 0.789 0.636 
Mc Fadden’s R2 (excluding 
accounting signals) 0.386 0.438 0.376 0.353 0.642 0.579 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis  is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year.  See Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table 3 for definitions of the country samples with high and low accounting precision, and to 
Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Reported coefficients represent the marginal effect averaged over all observations. Standard errors in 
parentheses are obtained using the delta method. ***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.   
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 TABLE A3: MARGINAL EFFECTS AVERAGED OVER THE SAMPLE (CONTINUED) 
 (C=COUNTRY, T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
 
Panel C: Analysis of Crises Using Accruals in Table 6 Panel B 
Model:  

        
18
i i k
c,t c,t n c,t c,t n c,t
k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator LeadingIndicators        
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
  Prior period 
[-n =-2] 
Prior period 
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent 
[-n =0] 
 
 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
High accounting 
precision countries 
Low accounting 
precision countries 
 
 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
dF
dX  
(∆ method se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals  
Accrualsc,t                  1.536*** -0.937 0.042 -0.347** -0.805** 0.345*** 
  (0.47) (1.05) (0.77) (0.18) (0.45) (0.08) 
 
  
  
  
Leading indicators from Table A2 
and time trend Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 135 142 143 151 151 160 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.424 0.463 0.389 0.388 0.789 0.636 
Mc Fadden’s R2 (excluding 
accounting signals) 0.386 0.438 0.376 0.353 0.642 0.579 
Notes: tcCrisisD ,_  is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year.  See Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table 3 for definitions of the country samples with high and low accounting precision, and 
to Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Reported coefficients represent the marginal effect averaged over all observations. Standard errors in 
parentheses are obtained using the delta method. ***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.   
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TABLE A4: ANALYSIS OF 33 SEVERE CRISES USING ACCOUNTING SIGNALS 
 
Model:  




    
    


2
i i
c,t c,t n c,t
18i 1
k
c,t n c,t
k 1
D_ SevereCrisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator
                                                                         LeadingIndicators        
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Prior period                                                  
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent                                                
[-n =0] 
 
High accounting 
precision 
countries 
Low accounting 
precision 
countries 
High accounting 
precision 
countries 
Low accounting 
precision 
countries 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals (=
i
) 
Accrualsc,t               1      -0.449 -2.833** -35.060*** 4.232*** 
  (6.72) (1.26) (13.46) (1.19) 
Profitabilityc,t 2    -16.924 2.340 -179.467*** 1.765 
  (13.08) (1.51) (39.69) (4.48) 
      
F- test: β1 ,  β2 = 0 
[P-value]: 
χ2 (2) = 1.90    
[0.387] 
χ2 (2) = 6.30        
[0.043] 
χ2 (2) = 22.51    
[<0.001] 
χ2 (2) = 12.73    
[0.002] 
Leading indicators from 
Table A2 and time trend Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 
3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No No No No 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 143 151 151 160 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.389 0.388 0.789 0.636 
Notes: 
c,t
D_Severe_Crisis  is an indicator variable indicating a severe crisis year. Severe crisis is defined as a crisis year if 
the country’s output loss in the subsequent year exceeds that year’s sample median.  subsequent year of the crisis.
 
See 
Table 1 for crisis years.  Refer to Table 3 for a definition of the country sample with high and low accounting precision, 
and to Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the leading indicator variables and accounting signals.  Standard errors 
clustered by year are in parentheses.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a 
two-tailed test.  
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 TABLE A5: ADJUSTING FOR LEADING INDICATORS WITH EXTREME VALUES 
(C=COUNTRY; T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
 
Model:  




    
    


2
i i
c,t c,t n c,t
18i 1
k
c,t n c,t
k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator  
                                                                                  LeadingIndicators        
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Prior period                                                  
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent                                                
[-n =0] 
 
High accounting 
precision 
countries 
Low accounting 
precision 
countries 
High accounting 
precision 
countries 
Low accounting 
precision 
countries 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Table 4’s Realized accounting signals (=
i
) 
Accrualsc,t               1      -3.281 -3.012** -43.928*** 5.046*** 
  (7.34) (1.35) (13.55) (1.19) 
Profitabilityc,t 2    -11.936 2.957* -195.179*** 2.268 
  (12.78) (1.53) (50.32) (4.43) 
      
F- test: β1 ,  β2 = 0 
[P-value]: 
χ2 (2) = 1.65    
[0.437] 
χ2 (2) = 6.26        
[0.044] 
χ2 (2) = 17.70    
[<0.001] 
χ2 (2) = 18.70    
[<0.001] 
Over-valuation_w -0.002 -0.008*** 0.035 -0.008*** 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
XS real M1 
balances_w  
0.021** 0.001 0.011** -0.015*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Leading indicators from 
Table A2 and time trend Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 
3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 143 151 151 160 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.394 0.408 0.794 0.634 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year. See Table 1 for crisis years. Refer to Table 3 for a 
definition of the country sample with high and low accounting precision, and to Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the 
leading indicator variables and accounting signals. We winzorize the two leading indicator variables with extreme values: 
Over-valuation and XS real M1 balances. Over-valuation_w is the deviation from the expected real exchange rate leading 
indicator variable winzorized at 3 percent. XS real M1 balances_w is the Excess real M1 balance leading indicator variable 
winzorized at 3 percent. Standard errors clustered by year are in parentheses.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
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TABLE A6: ANALYSIS OF CRISES USING ALTERNATIVE USER-BASED MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING PRECISION 
(C=COUNTRY; T=YEAR, 17 COUNTRIES, YEARS = 1983 – 2005) 
Model: 




    
    


2
i i
c,t c,t n c,t
18i 1
k
c,t n c,t
k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator
                                                                         LeadingIndicators        
 
1
HC
I : if country rank of accounting precision exceeds the sample median, 0 otherwise.  
1
LC
I : if country rank of accounting precision is the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Prior period                                                  
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent                                                                                                 
[-n =0] 
 
High analyst 
following 
countries 
Low analyst 
following 
countries 
High analyst 
following 
countries 
Low analyst 
following 
countries 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Accrualsc,t                β
1  -9.215 -2.692* 18.838 5.147*** 
  (11.30) (1.39) (15.64) (1.34) 
Profitabilityc,t  β
2    -1.185 2.466* -190.159 -1.772 
  (22.68) (1.49) (128.67) (3.02) 
      
F- test: β1 ,  β2 = 0 
[P-value]: 
χ2 (2) = 0.81   
[0.669] 
χ2 (2) = 4.26        
[0.12] 
χ2 (2) = 6.64    
[0.036] 
χ2 (2) = 17.30    
[<0.001] 
Leading indicators from 
Table A2 and time trend Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 
3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 105 189 111 200 
Adjusted R2 0.561 0.349 0.691 0.562 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis  is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year. See Table 1 for crisis years. Refer to Table 4 and Table 
A2 for definitions of the accounting signals and leading indicator variables.  Countries with high and low accounting 
precision are partitioned using the median analysts following from I/B/E/S. Analyst following is defined as the median 
scaled by price (see Li, Lehavy, and Merkley 2011) in each country-year. We average the ranks for each country-year over 
the sample period starting from the earliest available year.  Our high precision countries are: Spain, Finland, Italy, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and India, and low precision countries are: Mexico, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Korea, Argentina, Turkey, and Brazil. Standard errors clustered by year are in parentheses.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.   
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 TABLE A7: ANALYSIS OF CRISES USING LOGIT MODELS 
 
Model: 




    
    


2
i i
c,t c,t n c,t
18i 1
k
c,t n c,t
k 1
D_Crisis AccountingSignal Lag Crises Indicator
                                                                         LeadingIndicators        
 
1
HC
I : if the country has high accounting precision, 0 otherwise.  
1
LC
I : if the country has low accounting precision, 0 otherwise. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Prior period                                                  
[-n =-1] 
Concurrent                                                                                                 
[-n =0] 
 
High accounting 
precision 
countries 
Low accounting 
precision 
countries 
High accounting 
precision 
countries 
Low accounting 
precision 
countries 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Accrualsc,t                β
1  -1.357 -4.892** -62.545** 9.246* 
  (12.75) (2.49) (28.10) (5.14) 
Profitabilityc,t  β
2    -28.959 4.134 -317.231*** 2.891 
  (28.64) (2.86) (81.70) (6.39) 
      
F- test: β1 ,  β2 = 0 
[P-value]: 
χ2 (2) = 1.09    
[0.579] 
χ2 (2) = 5.70        
[0.058] 
χ2 (2) = 15.48    
[<0.001] 
χ2 (2) = 0377    
[0.152] 
Leading indicators from 
Table A2 and time trend Included Included Included Included 
Indicator (crisis within last 
3 yrs) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustering on year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
# country-years 143 151 151 160 
Pseudo R2 0.389 0.379 0.784 0.652 
Notes: ,_ c tD Crisis  is an indicator variable indicating a crisis year. See Table 1 for crisis years. Refer to Table 3 for a 
definition of the country sample with high and low accounting precision, and to Table A2 and Table 4 for definitions of the 
leading indicator variables and accounting signals. Standard errors clustered by year are in parentheses.  ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively, using a two-tailed test.   
 
 
